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[Pynchon's) three books .. . are weak in at least the 
sense that they are susceptible to no one certain 
outline of an interpretation: that is to say, they lack 
emotional power, and all feeling is bogged down in in­
tricate cerebral detail. Many readers find them tedious 
and unreadable! 
More starkly than most, Martin Seymour-Smith states the prob­
lem that many critics have had with Pynchon: the elaborate detail in 
his fiction seems to work against any "certain" interpretation. Pynchon 
seems more interested in fi lling his works with isolated bits of infor­
mation than in creating sympathetic characters whose stories we can 
follow. As Seymour-Smith puts it, "gobbets of what look like undigested 
knowledge hang about and clutter up the flow of Pynchon's undoubtedly 
manic inventiveness."z Critics find Pynchon hard to swallow because 
he has not properly "digested" his facts so that they may " flow" as 
fiction. The bits of information Pynchon provides do not cohere; the 
main subject of his fiction cannot be determined; hence, Pynchon can­
not possibly be considered a "great" writer. In a telling juxtaposition, 
Seymour-Smith describes Pynchon as a writer "who cannot be 
categorized-and whose impact is by now fast diminishing:'3 Pleased 
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that Pynchon's uncategorizable fictions are no longer sowing confu­
sion among future writers, Seymour-Smith concludes with a most 
definite categorization (again, his word) of Pynchon's value: "Of course 
Pynchon is not 'great' or even almost great: he is not in that category."• 
Though obviously overstated, Seymour-Smith's charges against 
Pynchon are serious and deserve equally serious attention. Those of 
us who believe that the " intricate cerebral detail " of Pynchon's fiction 
is intimately involved in the creation of multi-dimensional characters 
must do more than give brief lessons in statistics, thermodynamics, 
and information theory; we must show how the many scientific (and 
other) allusions work in very complex ways to define character just as 
characters may work to redefine their scientific (and other) contexts. 
The elusive subject of Pynchon's fiction will then be seen to be sub­
jec ivity itself-the ways in which scientific, social, sexual, and literary 
forms characterize the self as a coherent (or incoherent) entity, and the 
ways in which that self may try to remake the very forms by wh ich it 
is constituted. 
The trouble some critics have had in trying to categorize Pynchon 
is due to the fact that his fict ions challenge-radically- many of the 
categories these critics accept as a given: a reasonably clear narrative 
structure or " flow;" allusions that do not come so thick and fast that 
they " bog down" the story's progress or impede identification with its 
characters; a work of fiction that separates its main subject from all 
the other possible subjects of fiction and does not get lost in a jumble 
of too many big themes. But Pynchon's subject is that constant inter­
penetration of different categories, forms, and contexts, and the way 
in which character is the intersection both controlled and controlling 
of these forms. The identification he expects us to make is with these 
intersected and -secting characters, with their attempt to find a suitable 
context in which to place themselves and join with a not-too-different 
other. 
Critics who have had trouble categorizing Pynchon's three 
novels, particularly the kaleidoscopically allusive, 760-page Gravity's 
Rainbow, have naturally turned to Pynchon's short fiction for help. " En­
tropy" has proven the favorite, anthologized and discussed more often 
than any other Pynchon short story because, as one critic put it, " The 
significance of the story grows, in retrospect, as an aesthetic source 
and a preface for the novels that follow. In contrast to their uncertain­
ties, this work is almost proverbial in its clarity and simplicity."5 With 
its contrapuntal or fugal structure,6 "Entropy" has served numerous 
critics as the strong, clear source ("almost pro-verbial " ) against which 
to understand all the complex words that came after. Downstairs is 
Meatball Mulligan, who tries to impose some kind of order on a " lease­
breaking" party that is fast degenerating into chaos, whi le upstairs we 
find Call isto and Aubade, who work desperately to keep chaos from 
entering their exquisitely ordered world. Mulligan succeeds in creating 
order because he is not afraid of hard work, while Callisto gives up and 
allows chaos to overwhelm him. 
This is the story as it has been told-categorized-by many a 
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critic, generally with the purpose of " providing any early example of 
Pynchon's treatment of [fill in the blank with any major theme]." 
The problem with readings of this kind is that, while they may seem 
to provide some framework in which to understand the notoriously hard­
to-delimit Gravity's Rainbow, they are in fact as reductive of " Entropy" 
as they will be of Pynchon's later works, for " Entropy" is, in ways we 
shall see, quite complex in its own right. If it can be called a "source" 
for Pynchon's later writings, that is because this short story is, like the 
works to come, packed full of allusions to many different contexts, 
scientific, social, sexual, and literary, no one of which should be arbitrari­
ly isolated from the others, for the point of the story lies in their 
intersection. 
What follows is an attempt to describe the complex relationship 
between character and the contexts in which it finds itself made and 
which it would like to change in order to remake itself. I begin by sug­
gesting a reason for what none of these cri t ics seems able to account 
for: exactly why does Callisto give up and allow the forces of "entropy" 
to engu lf him? I argue that his resignation is really a last desperate at­
tempt at resistance, the means by which he intends not to lose, but 
to triumph over chaos. This new interpretation of the end of the story 
then leads to a reconsideration of its beginning and middle, to a discus­
sion of how Callisto's polarizing consciousness is both constituted by 
and continually reconstitutes his surrounding contexts-philosophical, 
scientific, sexual , historical, and literary. I will show how Cal listo's 
abstract divisions between free will and chance, order and entropy, male 
and female, and his equally abstract identifications between past and 
present, between l ife and a certain kind of art, lead to his final deci­
sion that the only happy context for him, the only state in which what 
he fears will be kept away and what he desires joined to him, is that 
of death. My argument, because it is about the relationship between 
contexts, will call attention to such things as the gender coding of 
Callisto's phi losophical concepts, the rhetorical nature of his sexual 
beliefs, and the history of his attitudes toward literature. I hope to 
demonstrate that it is only by attending to Callisto's interaction with 
all these contexts that we can come close to understand ing his actions 
in the story, particu larly his decision to commit suicide.' 
Callisto negates himsel f in order to beat the forces of negation; 
he jumps to conclusions so that he wi ll not have to suffer being pushed. 
And this preemptive strike against the self is not only meant to forestall 
an attack from the other (what is left of the self for the other to destroy?), 
but also to seize for the self the other's power, to place the self in a 
position of dominance like that of the other. By " making like" the other, 
the self hopes to assimilate its power; by destroying himself ahead of 
time, the son tries to wrest the scythe from Father Time.8 The activity 
of self-demolition may be the only freedom from passivity before the 
other's destructive force; if one has not the strength to live, perhaps 
exerting one's will to die will bring a whole new l ife. If the self must 
fail in its attempt at purity because of the constant contamination by 
a soiled other, why not permit oneself to be saturated, completely defiled 
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so as to acquire the other's transcendent order, wholly corrupted so 
as to be broken into a new sense of self-unity? 
Having first assumed that the other is all-powerful, one then 
assumes the other-absorbs the other's power by being absorbed in­
to it. The assumption concerning the other's omnipotence is really one 
with the self's desire for absolute power. The self only "sees" the other 
through the mirror of its own fear and desire, the fear of being over­
taken (by the other, by time) provoking the desire to take over. We could 
say that for the self illusion fosters illusion, that idealism produces 
nihilism which gives rise to still more idealism: the assumption that 
the omniscience and omnipotence lacking to the self inhere in an 
"other"9 leads to the assumption that if one assimilates the other (or, 
what amounts to the same thing, if one negates oneself in order to be 
assimilated by the other), then one can fill that lack and be whole like 
the "other." 
But the self must never admit the possibility that it may have 
made an unwarranted assumption, that the idealizing categories through 
which it views the other may be more of a mirror than a window, more 
narcissistic fantasy than self-confirming truth. If the other were truly 
other than what the self desires, if the threat it posed to the self were 
any less great than that with which the self would want to menace the 
other, then how could the self hope to achieve its ideal of omnipotence 
through self-annihilation? The masochistic self must believe in the ex­
istence of a sadistic other who will impose restraints so severe that 
the masochist will be sure of the sadist's power, certain of the omni­
potence with which the masochist himself would identify. The self can 
turn bondage into freedom; it can rewrite a play in which it has an 
assigned part. But uncertainty as to the other's authority frees the self 
only to doubt, gives the self the task of revising a play written in a 
language the self may not know. Knowledge of one's limits can always 
be reconverted into power, but the lack of certainty only reinforces the 
self 's fear of a basic lack of power. To admit the possibility that one's 
knowledge may be limited would thus be to confess to the worst of 
possible limitations, for an uncertain limit is like a contest that no one 
can win because no one knows the rules, or like an hourglass that can­
not be turned over again because one cannot tell when the sand has 
run out. In order to maintain its definition of the other as filling for the 
self 's lack of being, as the transcendental signified to which everything 
in the self points, the self must continually deny the possibility that 
it may not know the significance of the other: what if the self merely 
slips from signifier to signifier without ever finding the locus of power 
it seeks? The endless defile of the signifier would be the worst possi­
ble defilement of the self's purity of meaning; every time that the self 
thinks it has found fulfillment in an other, it may only have discovered 
another avoidance of power. To entertain the possibility of a limit to 
the self's knowledge is thus to occupy oneself with something that can­
not be held in place; to introduce the idea is to admit something that 
cannot be taken in if the self is to remain itself: uncertainty about the 
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other is truly destructive in that it confounds the self's faith that it knows 
itself. 
This aversion to an uncertain limit explains why Cal listo in " En­
tropy" is so quick to accept a hopelessly pessimistic view of the other 
and the future as the truth: strangely, pessimism is his only hope; the 
certainty of his total estrangement from both the other and the future 
is the closest he can get to grasping them. The possibility that his words 
may be inadequate to an understanding of the world, that his negative 
reduction of the situation might be just that-a reduction, is barely 
raised before being repressed as more dangerous than the certainty 
of danger: 
He was aware of the dangers of the reductive fallacy 
and, he hoped, strong enough not to drift into the 
gracefu l decadence of an enervated fatalism. His had 
always been a vigorous, Italian sort of pessimism: like 
Machiavelli, he allowed the forces of virtu and fortuna 
to be about 50/50; but the equations now introduced 
a random factor which pushed the odds to some unut­
terable and indeterminate ratio which he found himself 
afraid to calcu late.[" Entropy:" 87-88/73}'0 
Cal listo goes on to decide that " that constant 37 [degrees Fahrenheit} 
was now decisive" (E: 98/85), to determine that because the temperature 
outside his window hasn't changed for three days the homogeneity is 
now terminal: the universe is dying of entropy. And, in a "sudden" and 
decisive blow, Callisto's lover Aubade breaks the window separating 
their "Hermetically sealed" room from the " vagaries of the weather," 
their " tiny enclave of regularity" from the "city's chaos" (E: 83-84/68), 
so that "37 degrees Fahrenheit should prevail both outside and inside, 
and forever" (E: 98/85-86). 
Concerned about preserving his " virtu" or viri lity, Callisto never 
felt unduly threatened by "fortuna" or lady luck because he always 
thought he knew her, that he possessed basic knowledge of the limits 
of her power: his " vigorous, Italian sort of pessimism" was more like 
a cleverly disgu ised form of optimism; his statement that he "allowed 
the forces of virtu and fortuna to be about 50/50" means less that he 
admitted the ratio than that he permitted it. But "fortuna" refuses to 
accommodate herself to the phallocratic order; against all likelihood, 
nature remains at 37 degrees for three days in a row, thus asserting that 
she is not merely the mirror of man's desires. By disturbing the male 
ratio, she shakes his faith in his ratiocinative powers; an "unutterable 
and indeterminate ratio" simply cannot be reasoned with or away. "Afraid 
to" speak the name or "calcu late" the force of " fortuna," Call isto is in 
danger of having his tongue and counting fingers cut off by the other 
sex; suddenly feminine irrationality disrupts the male body. For Callisto, 
to "f[ i}nd himself afraid to calculate" is to find himself unmanned." 
It is just at this point that Callisto commits his most audacious 
act-a last, desperate attempt to regain the viri lity he fears to have lost: 
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before " fortuna" can unman him, he castrates himself to show that he 
is still the one wielding the knife; before chance can destroy his reason, 
he self-destructs to prove that he can comprehend randomness, expect 
the unpredictable. Rather than quake before odds that may be worse 
than "50150," Callisto stands firm in the belief that he will not survive. 
If there is no chance for Callisto, then there is no chance (" fortuna" ) 
for Callisto: if death can be known, it need not be feared. The smashing 
of the window to let "chaos" in to the " Hermetically sealed " room is 
merely the physical confirmation of a psychological self-destruction: 
before the glass partition is broken and the "vagaries of the weather" 
disrupt the controlled " regularity" of the room, Callisto has already 
decided that the glass will not hold ("[in] his obsession .. . that cons­
tant 37 was now decisive" ). In his imagination of certain destruction 
by the other, he has theoretically already committed suicide. The gap 
between envisioning one's inevitable destruction and suffering it blindly 
is introduced by Callisto as a saving grace (period): as long as he has 
time to see the castration by which the member separating him from 
a "slhe" will be removed , he can still believe that " he" remains virtual­
ly intact; that if his member is taken it is solely by his own permission ; 
that his member may be gone but not his membership in the gender 
of power. 
Calisto thus reduces the complexity of " fortuna," the indeter­
minacy of the other and the future, to the fearsome type of a castrating 
female because this is the least dangerous figure he can imagine: with 
it in mind he will at least have something known against which to take 
action, even if precisely what he knows is that there is no worse im­
aginable, that there exists nothing so terrible as to be beyond the 
bounds of his imagination. Though " He was aware of the dangers of 
the reductive fallacy and, he hoped, strong enough not to drift into the 
graceful decadence of an enervated fatalism;· Callisto's fatalistic reduc­
tion of "fortuna" is actually designed to preserve his phallic potency, 
to enable mean ingful action where none before was possible; nature 
cannot be beaten at her own game unless man knows the rules; for 
Callisto to kill himself now would be senseless if nature were not just 
about to usurp his power of self-determination. Cal l isto's reductive 
phallacy works by assigning the phallus to mother (nature) only so that 
he may rec laim it for himself; the omnipotence that he so desires but 
fears he lacks is "found" in the other only so that he may take it away. 
Callisto's hysteron proteron, his assuming as true what has yet to be 
proved (" that constant 37 was now decisive" ) and his placement of the 
weaker sex as first in power, is thus a clever attempt to deny that "truth" 
and to overturn that "dominance": by defining " power" in his own 
polarized terms, Cal listo hopes to assure himself of the poles' rever­
sibility; if he can let woman go first, that shows his power as a man. 
But Callisto must also hide from himself the phallaciousness 
of his reasoning: to believe in his own viri lity he must deny that his view 
of woman is merely a male fantasy. If " she" does not possess the 
castrating knife, then who will " he" get it from (be castrated by, wrest 
power from)? If man's hysteron proteron is merely phallacious, then what 
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are the terms of argument by which man can prove his power? Callisto's 
reductive phallacy is thus revealed to be a defense against his real 
castration anxiety: that woman too may lack the phallus; that the power 
man seeks may not be obtainable from her; that man may have been 
cut off at birth from the force he wil l never understand or master in life. 
Without the phallus fearfully but really hopefully assigned to her by man, 
"s/he" is really no other than " he" and will no longer support the illu· 
sion of a saving difference. It is significant that the only other that man 
will accept is a " s/he" so much more powerful than " he" himself, so 
comprehensibly different, that man feels incited to, and can succeed 
in, making her power his own. The "s/he" man wants is his exact op­
posite; the difference he desires is only the one most like himself, the 
one he likes for being the mirror (enlarged) of his (too small) phal lus. 
Any asymmetrical difference or incalculable otherness is rejected as 
unrecognizable: man cannot find himself in it, cannot refound himself 
on surer ground using it as a more stable plan than the original. 
Thus Cal listo can countenance a " fortuna" exact ly like him 
("50/50") or a fortune that is his exact opposite (a one-in-a-million chance 
of survival is no "chance" at all), but he cannot face any less certain 
figure. Trying to find himself in the other, he prefers a "she" whose 
weakness can assure him of his own potency (recall that Cal listo's 
pessimistic " 50/50" was real ly a disguised form of optimism), but a 
strong "she" wi ll do well if not better for then he can find his face in 
her disfiguring power, his phallus in her knife. Whether Callisto is always 
at the power-end of the pole or whether he starts in the weak position 
the better to jump to the dominant end, the one thing he must believe 
is that the pole exists, that there is a difference between himself and 
the "other" to be maintained or overcome. If power could not be located 
at one end or the other, Callisto would not know how to find it; the real 
lack that Callisto's polarizing consciousness works hard to repress is 
thus a lack of knowledge, without which power cannot even be iden­
tified (defined and made one's own)!2 
We note too that Callisto's movement from a faith in "equal" odds 
to a belief in his imminent destruction (and resurrection) is not acciden­
tal, but the inevitable effect of his polarizing consciousness, of the way 
in which he ses his situation. In order to firm up his flaccid sense of 
self-unity, Callisto hardens his defin ition of reason and "regularity" so 
as to stand strong against any possible threat from the other. But the 
more thoroughly he fortif ies himself against the other as a possible 
threat, the more l ikely the other is to look like a threat; the narrower 
his terms of survival, the more likely the other wil l appear not to fit but 
to chal lenge them. So, whi le Callisto may wish to keep believing that 
"fortuna" occupies the weak end of the pole across from his position 
of strength, his own irrepressible fear of weakness will continue to make 
"fortuna" look stronger and stronger unti l the odds against him appear 
overwhelming, at which point he has no choice but to hasten the self· 
destruction through which he can identify with her power. The more 
Cal listo self-protectively emphasizes his difference from " fortuna," the 
more that very difference undermines his attempt at self-identity, finally 
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forcing him to identify with precisely that from which he had originally 
tried to maintain a difference. The self's polarizing consciousness is 
thus self-defeating or, as Callisto hopes, the way to self-fu lfillment 
through identification with the other that the self desires. If you can't 
beat 'em, join 'em as a way of beating them; the other with her threaten· 
ing difference can be seen as likable if she proves by defeating man 
to have the power that man wants. 
This dynamic of an increasing (imagined) polarization resulting 
in a final (imagined) unity operates on several levels in " Entropy": be· 
tween Callisto and " fortuna," Callisto and Aubade, Callisto and the bird 
he shelters. Just as Callisto's extraordinary desire for survival leads to 
a proportionately extreme fear of mortality, so his self-defensively strict 
definition of l ife (order, reason) makes even the most minor deviations 
from his norm appear as chaos and irrationality. "The cosmologists had 
predicted an eventual heat-death for the universe (something like Lim· 
bo: form and motion abolished, heat-energy identical at every point in 
it)" (E: 85/69), but Callisto's fear of this eventuality is so strong that every 
sign that might point to its coming seems to confirm its occurrence 
now. So desirous is Callisto of ensuring the preservation of his space 
in time that he ends up cornering himself in a " Hermetically sealed" 
room and blinding himself to a future any different from his past (for 
him, after three days "that constant 37 was now decisive"). The great 
irony of Callisto's polarizing consciousness is that in its attempt to 
secure space and time it ends up displacing itself to narrower and nar­
rower confines whi le terminating its vision of the future to ever shorter 
periods. The resu lt of this drive for position and persistence is a feel­
ing that there is no time left, no space that can be defended from at· 
tack by the other. In fact, Callisto's need for spatio-temporal security 
is so extreme that he can only see space (true otherness) and time (an 
unpredictable future) themselves as enemies. The self's only way to 
security thus becomes self-destruction, the transcendence of al l limita· 
tion through identifying with the very power to delimit. 
Because Callisto cannot accept the " vagaries of the weather" 
as compatible with or even necessary to the regulation of "order" in 
his room, because he can only see " fortuna" as "chaos" rather than 
as a likable or saving difference, he is doomed to usher in the entropy 
he so fears, to " abolish" his own " form and motion," eradicate his own 
space and time, in an imitative identification with the supposedly 
destructive forces of nature. Although he knows that without the in· 
troduction of a saving difference entropy will only increase ("the isolated 
system-galaxy, engine, human being, culture, whatever-must evolve 
spontaneously toward the Condition of the More Probable" [E: 87/72-73D, 
it is precisely Cal listo's narrow definition of what constitutes "differen· 
tiation" and "ordered individuality" that brings on the "sameness" and 
"chaos" he fears (E: 88/74): by differentiating himself so thoroughly from 
the other, by viewing all otherness as a threatening difference, he 
isolates his own system from any beneficial change. Cal listo's extreme 
ideal of order is chaos: any system that cuts itself off from all outside 
influence in an attempt to become absolutely self-sufficient inevitably 
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self-destructs; for a structure to survive, for any order to be maintained, 
there must be an interdependence of parts. For this reason Callisto's 
efforts to cut himself off from " that constant 37" as if he could thereby 
excise the very threat of sameness, as if the process of entropy were 
a thing that could be cut out, only results in his own muti lation, in an 
organism so " self-identical" that it is wholly disorganized and cannot 
survive. In trying to differ/defer the possibly negative effects of space 
and time, Callisto ends up estranging himself from himself: he becomes 
the very (dis)embodiment of the destructive process which he had tried 
to reify and remove as the "other." The on ly way that Callisto can find 
to fend off ill fortune and come into his own (lady luck) is to kil l the 
very ego that desires and fears, to abolish the spatio-temporal difference 
that sustained his attraction and repulsion. Callisto's liebestod with " for­
tuna" is thus the realization of entropy: " heat-energy identical at every 
point." His polarizing consciousness destroys the material world in an 
attempt to bring it into unity. 
The attraction-repulsion between Callisto and his lover Au bade 
mirrors that between the man and Mistress Fortune. Neither wife nor 
stranger, Aubade makes love with Callisto even as she keeps her 
distance, desiring meaningfu l contact but always suspicious of the 
other's meaning, wanting fulfillment but afraid of any " threat" to her 
carefully guarded " purity": 
The architecton ic purity of her world was constantly 
threatened by such hints of anarchy: gaps and ex­
crescences and skew l ines, and a shifting or tilting of 
planes to which she had continually to readjust lest 
the whole structure shiver into a disarray of discrete 
and meaningless signals. Callisto had described the 
process once as a kind of " feedback": she crawled into 
dreams each night with a sense of exhaustion, and a 
desperate resolve never to relax that vigilance. Even 
in the brief periods when Callisto made love to her, 
soaring above the bowing of taut nerves in haphazard 
double-stops wou ld be the one singing string of her 
determination. [E: 88/73-74] 
Desiring to form a new whole with Callisto, Aubade is nevertheless afraid 
that the attempt will merely destroy her own integrity. The movement 
of their bodies in love is thus fearfully imagined as a "shifting and tilting 
of planes to which she had continually to readjust," as " haphazard 
double-stops" (two notes produced simultaneously on a string instru­
ment by drawing the bow over two strings at the same time) which con­
stantly threaten her "determination" to remain at "one" with herself. 
Neither a new creature composed of herself and Callisto nor herself 
alone, Aubade is caught between structures, feeling the loss of her 
orig inal unity even as she reaches to draw the other into a new whole. 
But intercourse for Aubade can only go so far: her narrow definition 
of integrity makes love the eruption of "gaps" in her otherwise perfect 
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intactness; like the ravaging effects of wind and weather, Callisto's 
desire to join with her only seems to disturb her attempt at self­
monumentalization. "That precious signal-to-noise ratio, whose delicate 
balance" Au bade feels she must keep is as defensively strict in its defini­
tion of " noise" (meaningless and thus potentially harmful signals from 
the other [E: 92/79]) as Callisto's own "ratio" of odds regarding "for­
tuna": Aubade's anxiety about Callisto as an embod iment of disorder, 
a form-splitting motion, matches Callisto's fear of " fortuna" as a 
castrating female who wou ld have/halve his orig inal wholeness.'3 Like 
Callisto, Aubade needs to "reduce" the element of chance in her l ife 
to the security of a foregone conclusion: she will only receive the other 
on her " terms," defining the whole they form together in her way: " the 
accidental fingers at the small of her back or feathery against her 
breasts came to her reduced inevitably to the terms of sound: of music 
which emerged at intervals from a howling darkness of discordancy" 
(E: 84/69). Yet Aubade's terms are so rigid they can never be met: there 
can be no real intercourse between her and Callisto because her ex­
treme fear of disorder makes sexual contact with him seem like the 
introduction of randomness itself, like a fatal submission to the "ac­
cidental" or " haphazard" that would destroy her very sense of self. 
If Aubade can on ly read Callisto's input as incomprehensible, 
can only see adjustment to him as assimilation by him, it should not 
be surprising that Callisto finds himself in exactly the same position 
of confusion or negative ambivalence regarding her: each sees not the 
other, but the externalization of the self's own fear of externality, of be­
ing beside itself; each fears being taken in, not so deeply inside a 
sheltering other that one feels secure from outside attack, but into the 
other-as-outside, into the very marginalization that one was trying to 
avoid. If the " Callisto" that Au bade "sees" is the result of a certain fear­
fu l aestheticization of life whereby her lover becomes an opener of 
"gaps" which threaten her "architectonic purity" or a maker of " noise" 
which disturbs her musical solo, then Callisto's "Aubade" is likewise 
a figure of art, a projection of Callisto's own fears as these are given 
form (and content?) by music and literature. Call isto " finds" his mistress 
between the covers of a book, "experiences" the meaninglessness of 
her love through the words of Faulkner, Djuna Barnes, and Henry Miller; 
the strange choreography to Stravinsky's music dictates the movement 
toward estrangement in his own relationship with Aubade: 
Callisto was trying to confront any idea of the heat­
death now.. .. He sought correspondences. Sade, of 
course. And Temple Drake, gaunt and hopeless in her 
little park in Paris, at the end of [Faulkner's] Sanctuary. 
Final equilibrium. [Barnes'] Nightwood. And the tango. 
Any tango, but more than any perhaps the sad sick 
dance in Stravinsky's L'Histoire du Soldat. He thought 
back: what had tango music been for them after the 
war, what meanings had he missed in all the stately 
coupled automatons in the cafes-dansants, or in the 
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metronomes which had ticked behind the eyes of his 
own partners? .... Stravinsky had managed to com­
municate in that tango the same exhaustion, the same 
airlessness one saw in the slicked-down youths who 
were trying to imitate Vernon Castle, and in their 
mistresses, who simply did not care. Ma maitresse. 
Celeste. Returning to Nice after the second war he had 
found that cafe replaced by a perfume shop which 
catered to American tourists. And no secret vestige 
of her in the cobblestones or in the old pension next 
door; no perfume to match her breath heavy with the 
sweet Spanish wine she always drank. And so instead 
he had purchased a Henry Miller novel and left for 
Paris, and read the book on the train so that when he 
arrived he had been given at least a little forewarning. 
And saw that Celeste and the others and even Temple 
Drake were not all that had changed. [E: 92-93/79·80] 
Callisto's modernist literary fathers pass their apocalyptism on to their 
postmodern reader-son, who seems more than ready to receive their 
evil tidings. The cultural parents in this passage transmit to Calisto a 
pessimistic way of seeing, a negative formal reduction of a world in 
otherwise uncertain motion:• Whether art imitates life or life, art it would 
be hard to say, for just as the "sad sick dance in Stravinsky's L'Histoire 
du Soldat' ' was written to express the real horrors of World War I, so 
the real-life cafe dancer "Vernon Castle" and his partner Irene press 
their bodies into the form of a sad sick dance, and just as more live 
"youths" and their "mistresses" try to imitate Castle and his partner 
in their dance, so novels are written with characters modeled on these 
hopeless couples. Life and art "correspond;' each confirming the other 
in a fear that the twentieth century is running down, becoming increas· 
ingly disordered or entropic. Callisto and his "maitresse. Celeste" merely 
extend the terrible rhyme between art and life up through World War 
II and into the present day, where Callisto and Aubade reduplicate the 
pattern.'5 
If Aubade attempts to live her art's narrow conception of formal 
purity, fearing Callisto's touching "fingers" as " accidental " and his 
sliding body as "haphazard" as if contact with him meant succumb· 
ing to the destructive force of randomness itself, then Callisto also 
brings strict modernist standards of aesthetic order into his judgment 
of life, rejecting any real connection with Aubade as if passion meant 
passivity before the entropic force she embodies. Once he has inter­
nalized the modernists' vision of an imminent apocalypse, love can no 
longer be seen in an unquestionably positive tight: " He was forced, 
therefore, in the sad dying fall of middle age, to a radical reevaluation 
of everything he had learned up to then; all the cities and seasons and 
casual passions of his days had now to be looked at in a new and elusive 
light" (E: 87/73). Love itself comes to seem like a fall into death; "casual 
passions," like "accidental fingers," threaten to make the self an acci­
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dent or casualty of the other's destructive force. Reading Aubade 
through Faulkner and the other modernists, Cal listo sees a " Temple 
Drake, Gaunt and hopeless" after being raped by power beyond her con· 
trol; he sees Aubade as one of the " mistresses, who simply did not care," 
like his " maitresse. Celeste" who left or died before he could return 
to find her. To make love with Au bade " means" to become one of those 
"coupled automatons" whose every move is not the coming together 
that each desires, but a prechoreographed dance of death d ictated by 
forces beyond their control. Seeing Au bade through art " means" see· 
ing through Au bade to the dire truth behind deceptively attractive ap­
pearances, to the " metronome" of death relent lessly " tick[ ing] behind 
[her] eyes." The uncertainty of the living, moving Au bade is formed by 
Call isto's artistic vision into the certainty of stasis, the "idea" of " heat· 
death:' Modernist paranoia about the death of the world prefigures 
Callisto's fear of Aubade, molds her face into a death mask and forecasts 
his love of her as necrophilia. 
In their attempt to define love so as to be certain of its saving 
power, the modernists only succeed in discovering the inextricable con­
nection between love and death; the more they insist upon securing 
themselves against disorder, the more love itself begins to look like 
disorder: 
Henry Adams, three generations before his own, had 
stared aghast at Power; Callisto found himself now in 
much the same state over Thermodynamics, the inner 
life of that power, realizing like his predecessor that 
the Virgin and the dynamo stand as much for love as 
for power; that the two are indeed identical; and that 
love therefore not only makes the world go round but 
also makes the boccie ball spin, the nebula precess. 
It was this latter or sidereal element which disturbed 
him [E: 84-85/69] 
In Callisto's fearful reading, the very mot ion that sustains form, that 
supports life on earth, must also destroy it; " love" or the earth's attrac· 
tion to the sun results in a transfer of heat necessary for the continuance 
of life, but also leads to the climactic end of all transference, the 
equilibrium of " heat-death:' In being drawn toward its source of required 
heat-energy, the earth simultaneously decreases the difference in 
temperature needed to maintain its own form of life. 
Like Aubade's notion of monumental stability, Callisto's 
modernist-inspired ideal of formal purity needs motion to complete it 
yet fears motion as depletion; outside energy is always desired to fill 
an insatiable sense of lack, but such energy is also feared as moving 
the self toward ultimate emptiness: when all the outside has been taken 
in, where can the constitutional ly needy self look for fulfillment? The 
difference between self and other that love encourages Callisto to over· 
come in order to achieve fulfillment is also the difference that cannot 
be conquered if the forever self-doubting Callisto is always to have some 
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new virgin from whom to gain a temporary sense of potency. Just as 
the earth's attraction to the sun, a movement that might be taken as 
the primary sign of life, can only appear as a death drive in the eyes 
of modernists who crave absolute security, so the love that Callisto is 
offered looks like death to one for whom every transfer of heat only 
increases a fear of the end of al l transference, every distance crossed 
and bit of time elapsed only portends the crossing out of space and 
the running out of time. 
Cal listo's desire is thus self-thwarting in that his every hopefu l 
movement toward a love-object is countered by a fear of motion itself: 
to attempt to bridge the gap between self and other is not only to ad· 
mit that there exists a gap that may be unbridgeable, but also to con· 
front the possibility that that gap may indeed be bridged, that in 
eliminating differences one may abolish differentiation itself. Cal listo 
desires a successful transfer of heat between himself and the other 
(assuring him of his potency) or between the other and himself (filling 
him with power), but his irrepressible fear that any motion will destroy 
form, that all transference or love tends toward nondifferentiation or 
death, makes every attempt at communication a self-confirming 
prophecy of fai lure. The Cal listo who shelters a sick bird in his arms, 
trying to "give it warmth" and make it " well again" (E: 83/68), is the same 
sick man whose " fingers pressed the bird more firmly, as if needing 
some pulsing or suffering assurance of an early break in the 
temperature" (E: 85/70). Callisto does not know where the source of heat· 
energy can be found, in himself or in the other, inside or outside; his 
great fear is that every potentially salubrious outside is really already 
a dead inside, and vice versa. No prospective love coming to or from 
him can override his fear of the coming of the end, of coming as the 
end. Callisto's inability to settle for anything less than absolute cer· 
tainty as to the locus of power makes any mere attempt at a transfer 
of energy seem fruitless; unable to tolerate the possibility of failure, 
Callisto ends up ensuring the necessity of failure, assuring himself that 
the assurance he seeks can be found nowhere. 
Significant ly, it is while he is lost in his reading of the despair· 
ing modernists that his situation suddenly becomes hopeless; think· 
ing so hard about past failures to communicate, he fails to connect in 
the present: "Callisto, he I pless in the past, did not feel the faint rhythm 
inside the bi rd begin to slacken and fail" (E: 97/84). Callisto's past 
reading predetermines his present (lack of) life. The bird's " heartbeat 
tick[ing] a gracefu l diminuendo down at last into stillness" (E: 97/85) 
is prefigured, preordained by the modern ists' image of the "metronome" 
of death " tick[ing] behind the eyes" of any potential " partner" in love. 
The modernists to whom he turned for his supposedly saving idea of 
order make his every experience look hopelessly entropic. The more 
information the self feels it needs before it can safely join with the other, 
the less likely it is that that joining will occur. The desire for absolute 
confirmation of the other's compatibility destroys the very possibility 
of communication that it was supposed to substantiate. The heat-energy 
expended on gathering information about the other leaves too little left 
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for an effective transfer. Aubade's attempt to ensure that the " signals" 
and the "noise" in a potential relationship with Callisto would be balanc­
ed according to an acceptable " ratio" burns up all the energy she might 
have preserved if she had been less fearful of communicating with him, 
just as Callisto's effort to save the bird from a present " heat-death" by 
trying to understand how others in "correspond[ing]" situations have 
dealt with the threat only wastes in a hopeless search for an infallible 
source of information the energy he might have devoted to warming 
the bird: 
That precious signal-to-noise ratio, whose delicate 
balance required every calorie of [Au bade's) strength, 
seesawed inside the small tenuous skull as she 
watched Call isto, sheltering the bird . Callisto was try­
ing to confront any idea of the heat-death now, as he 
nuzzled the feathery Jump in his hands. He sought cor­
respondences . . .. Callisto, helpless in the past, did not 
feel the faint rhythm inside the bird begin to slacken 
and fail. [E: 92-93, 97/79, 84] 
There are thus two ways in which Callisto is " helpless in the 
past" having spent so much energy looking to the past in an effort to 
gather enough information about "heat-death" that he can be sure to 
defeat it, Callisto is left with too little energy to fight the battle that 
counts-the one in the present; and having allowed the despairing 
modern ists to shape his understanding of the postmodern condition, 
Callisto has doomed himsel f to repeat their past helplessness. Past 
thinkers only confirm Callisto in his belief that complete knowledge 
of " heat-death" is required before the self can safely fight it. In giving 
him th is "answer" to his quest- they insist he must keep looking for 
more and better answers - the modernists effectively solve Callisto's 
problem by proving it insoluble: once he knows that he' ll never know 
enough about " heat-death" to be sure of defeating it, then he knows 
that there is no answer but death, nothing but to be defeated by it. The 
endlessness of Callisto's search becomes its only end: because he feels 
he needs more information about the present, Call isto looks to the past 
which , instead of directing him back toward the present, toward living 
with the uncertainty of hope, merely extends his search indefinitely, 
thus providing him with certain hopelessness. Rather than think that 
the answer cannot be found in the past, Callisto takes its un locatabili· 
ty as the answer, as evidence of a negative result. The two ways in which 
Callisto is "helpless in the past" are thus mutually reinforcing: expend· 
ing energy on the past in order to gain information about the present 
yields only information about the uselessness of past expenditures of 
energy; the modernists merely reinforce the same fear of insufficient 
information that Callisto had gone to them to relieve. Callisto's search 
both finds examples, and is itself an example, of the useless expen­
diture of energy; it finds examples because it is an example (since he 
would never have looked to the past if he had felt that the present pro­
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vided him with enough information, Callisto is already pred isposed to 
consider whatever information he receives to be inadequate) and it is 
an example because it finds examples (since Callisto only considers 
information about past thinkers who have wasted their time, his own 
consideration is bound to be a waste of time). 
Information about others and the past is supposed to help 
Callisto save the bird, Aubade, and himself in the present; expending 
energy to gain knowledge is necessary to ensure a usefu l expenditure 
of energy in a successful transfer of heat (Cal listo needs some idea 
of where the heat-source is before he can transfer it, of what "heat· 
death" is before he can combat it). But there is a l imit to the amount 
of energy at Cal listo's disposal; there is a point of diminishing returns 
beyond which the energy spent on knowledge becomes less a prere­
quisite for than a preclusion of the energy needed for action.'6 For 
Callisto knowledge and action are at odds, not only because his endless 
search for total knowledge voids the energy he must have to act (his 
means preclude his end), but also because the kind of knowledge 
Cal listo seeks is really incompatible with action. The greater Callisto's 
fear of failure if he attempts a transfer of heat, the greater his desire 
for complete information about where to find heat and where it should 
go. In fact, the only kind of knowledge that would provide Callisto with 
the absolute guarantee of success that his fear demands is the 
transcendental knowledge of God, the wisdom of One who sees al l 
because He is above time and beyond space. But the transfer of heat 
that Callisto would effect is within time and space, between live bodies. 
Callisto demands an otherworld ly knowledge before he will act in this 
world, but in order to gain heavenly wisdom he must already have given 
up hope of worldly action; to know the effect of any attempted transfer 
of heat between bodies in time he must already have stepped outside 
the limited perspective of his own body and time. The ab-solute 
knowledge that is meant to ensure the continuing interdependence of 
bodies could only be achieved independent of the body; Callisto cou ld 
ensure that he would remain a part of everyth ing else only if he were 
apart from everything else. For Callisto to sez it all at once, either he 
must have removed himself from the motion (the transfer of heat) he 
would effect, or everything else must have stopped moving, in which 
case it wou ld be too late for any t ransfer of heat. Either way, the total 
knowledge he seeks can only come at the end rather than renew the 
beginning of himself or the world. Callisto's failure to see the incom­
patibi lity between total knowledge and worldly action is closely tied 
to his failure to recognize the point of diminishing returns at which he 
must stop looking for more information or risk not having enough energy 
left to act: his inability to see that absolute knowledge must always 
be cut off from earth ly interaction is the mirror of his fai lure to realize 
that worldly knowledge must always be connected with world ly action. 
There is no exact science of thermodynamics, only limited information 
that fallible scientists try to put to act ive use. 
In each of these relationships, then, Callisto fails to find the 
openness necessary for communication; instead, he merely finds 
229 
repeated his own fearfu l impermeability. The past to which he turns for 
help in his road-blocked present becomes less a detour than a dead 
end: the modernists reflect back to Callisto his own despairing face 
and make communication with the bird in the present seem impossi­
ble. Instead of opening up possibi lities for present action, the past limits 
the present to more of the same, defines the postmodern as a repeti ­
tion of modern failure. Callisto wants to use the modernists as a medium 
by which to reach the bird; he would put his faith in a space-time con­
tinuum where going back in time might help him cross a space in the 
present. But Callisto's fearful journey into the past abolishes both space 
and time: from his correspondence with the modernists he " learns" 
of every self's repeated failure to correspond with any other; from his 
movement back in time he "discovers" that there has never been time 
for movement, that there has never been movement in time. Present 
and future attempts will be no different from past failures to cross space; 
every attempt at a successfu l transfer of heat will always be too late 
to succeed. Cal listo's journey back thus ends in the timelessness of 
an end lessly repeated fai lure to communicate, in the nowhere of a self 
that cannot find its own place because it lacks any relationship with 
a defining other. 
What I have tried to show in the above argument is that the 
mediating structures Callisto uses in his effort to communicate are the 
obstacles to communication . Each time he turns to another context 
for help in escaping the binary divisions of a previous thought-structure, 
he merely " finds" those divisions repeated and exacerbated. The divi­
sion in science, as Callisto understands it, between order and chaos 
is only made to seem more hopelessly irresolvable when Callisto tries 
to deal with it in philosophical terms. When the order-and chaos binary 
is aligned with the split between free will and determinism, and when 
fear and desire begin their predictable operation on the polarity they 
themselves created, Callisto's fear of a predetermined chaos gradually 
overwhelms any faith in a will to order, and he finally comes to believe 
that the on ly possible exercise of free will open to him is to bring chaos 
upon himself, just as the only way in which he can assert his order on 
the world is to identify that order with the chaos he fears is predeter­
mined. Science and phi losophy (or Callisto's understanding of them) 
only inform- rigid ify and seem to lend authority to-the polarities of 
Callisto's consciousness; every new context in which Callisto finds 
himself placed (or places himself) proves to have the same binary divi­
sions pointing to the same suicidal end. 
By thinking of will or " virtu" as male like himself, Callisto tries 
to appropriate the power that he so desires, but the metaphor backfires: 
his investment in polarized gender categories brings with it a fear of 
the same women he had originally desired to protect with his power. 
Unable to believe that maleness alone guarantees power, Callisto is ter­
rified by the thought that power is exclusively female, that only women 
have the power. Sexual intercourse thus becomes a threat and the on­
ly way in which he can imagine joining with the terrible female princ i­
ple in nature (" fortuna") or with his female lover (Abuade) is to identify 
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with thei r power over him by destroying himself. Both Callisto and 
Aubade turn to art as a model for life, but " find" instantiated there the 
same formal divisions each was trying to move beyond in their relation· 
ship together. The stark antithesis between artistic order and the chaos 
of life repeats itself in their lives as an impossible choice between a 
lonely self-unity and a self-destructive togetherness. In the end, the only 
way they can find to join the stability of form and the human warmth 
of emotion is to destroy themselves, thus (they hope) leaving beh ind 
all the hopelessly binary artistic, sexual, philosophcal, and scientific 
divisions of this world and entering another where al l is one: after 
smashing the window to let chaos in, Aubade " turned to face [Callisto] 
and wait with him until the moment of equilibrium was reached, when 
37 degrees Fahrenheit should prevai l both outside and inside, and 
forever, and the hovering, curious dominant of their separate lives should 
resolve into a tonic of darkness and the final absence of all motion" 
(E: 98/85·86). 
At the end as throughout the story, Pynchon describes his 
characters' thoughts and actions in terms of the contexts in which those 
characters live. Cal listo and Au bade think of their suicide as a triumph 
over the divisive categories of the very contexts to which they had turned 
for help in dealing with division: order and entropy, free will and deter­
minism, male and female will be joined at last; each character will have 
the stability of a work of art and at the same time each wi ll be one with 
the other. In abolishing their own form and motion, space and time, 
these characters try to identify with the power- whatever it is-that 
created these divisions in the first place and can presumably reun ite 
them at will. Unable to discover this power in any one of life's contexts, 
they assume that it must lie beyond life and death, in the context of 
contexts, and their final act of self-destruction is intended to l ift them 
out of al l of life's polarizing and hence limiting contexts to join the one 
true source of knowledge and power. 
Pynchon's narrator stays very close to Cal listo's and Aubade's 
perspective in the sections of the story dealing with these characters, 
particularly at the end, so it is surprising that no critic has ever argued 
that there might be some real connection between the characters' 
despairing attitude toward l ife's contexts and the attitude of Pynchon 
the author!7 Of course " Entropy" is also the story of Meatball Mulligan, 
who is able to achieve some kind of workable relationship between op­
posing forces, and critics have understandably sought to find Pynchon's 
own attitude there, in the positive results that can come from hard work. 
But the fact remains that the story ends with Cal listo and with his 
perspective. Critics who discounted this fact upon fi rst reading have 
reacted with dismay and outright disbelief at Pynchon's own statements 
about the meaning of his story, made recently in his " Introduction" to 
Slow Learner. There Pynchon consistently links his own att itudes at 
the time he wrote the story with those of-not Mulligan, but Callisto. 
Pynchon even goes so far as to say that his own apocalyptism reduced 
Callisto to someth ing less than a fully human character and that this 
was Pynchon's own fau lt as an inexperienced author: 
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A pose I found congenial in those days- fairly com­
mon, I hope, among pre-adults-was that of somber 
glee at any idea of mass destruction or decline. The 
modern political thri ller genre, in fact, has been known 
to cash in on such visions of death made large-scale 
or glamorous. Given my undergraduate mood, Adams's 
sense of power out of control, coupled with [Norbert] 
Wiener's spectacle of universal heat-death and 
mathematical stillness, seemed just the ticket. But the 
distance and grandiosity of this led me to short-change 
the humans in the story. I think they come off as syn­
thetic, insufficiently alive.'8 
Richard Poirier, generally one of Pynchon's most sympathetic and 
perceptive critics, is completely taken aback; in a disappointed essay 
mockingly ti t led " Humans," Poirier can't help but see Pynchon as his 
own worst critic: 
[Pynchon's] jaunty complaints in the Introduction that 
the stories in Slow Learner fail to provide full, lifelike 
characters are .. . so curious and irrelevant as to sug­
gest that he is kidding - and I am afraid he isn't - or 
that he is tired . . . . What " humans" can he be talking 
about? Their absence, their " short changing" of 
themselves is precist'liY the point of the story. To com­
plain about it is to miss the point. .. . It is obvious that 
it is not Pynchon but [his main character] who is 
" literary" [and " scienti fic" and otherwise overly in­
fluenced by categories] . . . and that even he 
recognises how much he thereby loses of direct 
human feeling and experience.'9 
But does Callisto short-change himsel f or is he short-changed 
by the categories to which he turns for help? Does the fault lie in his 
character and in what he makes of his contexts, or in those contexts 
themselves, the only ones available to Callisto for the formation of his 
character? In my essay I have continually returned to the question of 
whether Callisto sees on ly what he is predisposed to find, or finds on­
ly what there is to see. Poirier, in flat ly stating that Call isto short-changes 
himself, seems to me to miss the point of the story, to oversimpl ify the 
complex relationship between character and context. As I hope to have 
shown, Pynchon does more in " Entropy" than merely condemn Callisto 
for his inabi lity to read correctly, to find in the philosophical, scientific, 
sexual, and literary contexts which surround him some way of healing 
the divisions in his l ife. And neither the story nor the " Introduction" 
to Slow Learner shows Pynchon to have a naive belief in the possibiltiy 
of "direct" or unmediated " human feeling and experience." The " In­
troduction" reveals Pynchon, like Cal listo, to have spent perhaps " too 
much time and energy on words alone," 20 but not as having given up 
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reading science, philosophy, or the OED in favor of some search for 
"direct" experience. The " Introduction" shows Pynchon, like Callisto, 
as having sometimes forgotten to check the facts in his fiction against 
the facts in other fiction (Pynchon mistook "grippe espagnole"[Spanish 
influenza] for someth ing much more apocalyptic),21 but not as having 
lost all faith in combining scientific and literary contexts in an attempt 
to understand the world. 
Perhaps what Pynchon has said about another work of fiction 
can help us understand what he wanted to say about character and con­
text in " Entropy." In reviewing a novel by his friend Oakley Hal l, Pyn­
chon directs us away from placing the whole of our blame on either 
one side or the other, character or context: 
Tombstone, Arizona, during the 1880's is, in ways, our 
national Camelot: a never-never land where American 
virtues are embodied in the Earps, and the opposite 
evils in the Clanton gang; where the confrontation at 
the OK Corral takes on some of the dry purity of an 
Arthurian joust. Oakley Hall, in his very fine novel 
Warlock (Viking) has restored to the myth of Tombstone 
its full , mortal , blooded humanity. Wyatt Earp is 
transmogrified into a gunfighter named Blaisdel l who, 
partly because of his blown-up image in the Wild West 
magazines of the day, believes he is a hero. He is sum­
moned to the embattled town of Warlock by a commit­
tee of nervous citizens expressly to be a hero, but finds 
that he cannot, at last, live up to this image; that there 
is a flaw not on ly in him but also, we feel, in the entire 
set of assumptions that have allowed the image to 
exist. It is Blaisdell 's private abyss, and not too dif­
ferent from the town's public one.22 
What Pynchon has tried to do in " Entropy" is to demonstrate precisely 
why Callisto's private abyss is " not too different" from our public one, 
why the " f law" in his character is also a " flaw . . . in the entire set of 
assumptions that have allowed the image [Callisto has constructed of 
himself] to exist." If Callisto believes that he must be the virtuous hero 
combatting evi l entropy, this is " partly [and only partly] because" he 
has made the mistake of reading books that polarize real ity into 
simplistic categories of good and evil, but also partly because he senses 
rightly that other people really expect him to play that role (" He is sum­
moned to the embattled town of Warlock by a committee of nervous 
citizens expressly to be a hero" ). The binary thinking to which Callisto 
is predisposed is also-and not just coincidentally- the only kind of 
thinking to which every context predisposes him; the simplistic opposi­
tion between good and evil that one finds in a political thriller or western 
myth is " not too different" from the polarized categories that one finds 
everywhere in " real" people's perceptions - scientific, philosophical, 
and sexual-of " real" life. 
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Critics who blame Callisto for short-changing himself not on ly 
miss the fact that Callisto's contexts are also to blame, but repeat the 
same simplistic and deadly division into "good guys" and " bad guys"­
"Callisto is the one at fault" -for which they are blaming Callisto. Critics 
who suggest that all Callisto has to do is to get beyond the mediating 
influence of categories and find some "direct human feeling and ex­
perience" repeat the same mistake made by Callisto and other unques­
tioning adherents to one point of view- the mistake of believing that 
what they see is the unvarnished- unmediated- truth about the world 
and not just one perspective among the many others possible. It takes 
a belief in the possibility of unmediated experience for critics to be so 
sure that they are right about just who or what is at fault in "Entropy," 
about who is short-changing whom. 
Pynchon's story, with its constant movement from character to 
context and back again, emphasizing how the one influences the other 
and vice versa, is intended to dispel this "never-never land" of critical 
certainty about right and wrong, good and evil. To be " human," as Pyn­
chon understands it, is to be required to form one's character within 
certain contexts, to see the world through particular perspect ives. The 
mistake he fears he made in his depiction of Callisto's character is in 
underestimating Cal listo's ability to be less a " synthesi[s]" of others' 
views and more "a liv[ing]" human being with some free will to move 
among the various contexts and categories available to him without 
adhering completely and forever to any one of them: "[I ] short-change[ d) 
the humans in the story. I think they come off as synthetic, insufficiently 
alive." 23 " Entropy," Pynchon says, is itself too much like the " political 
thrillers" he was reading at the time: the story shows Pynchon just 
beginning to question his characters' unquestioning adherence to cer­
tain views of the world, just beg inning to real ize that he as an author 
can advocate a necessary but provisional belief in categories not only 
by showing the terrible fate of characters who believe too much in any 
particular set of oppositions, but also by creating characters who, l ike 
himself as author, can move in and out of contexts without placing 
themselves-or finding themselves placed-in any one.2' 
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo 
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